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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHAD E. BENNION, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRISTINE BENNION (HESS), 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Appeal No. 20070191-CA 
District Case No. 964903735 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BRIEF OF APPELLANT ADEQUATELY MARSHALS THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL. 
Christine Bennion, Appellee (hereinafter "Hess"), argues throughout her Brief of 
Appellee that Chad Bennion, Appellant ("Bennion") has incorrectly cited various 
portions of the Utah Code. Hess relies on statues that went into effect during 2007. The 
statues Bennion relied upon in his opening brief were from 2006 or earlier, which are the 
statues in effect at the time of trial in the instant matter. Hess is clearly mistaken in her 
citation to statutes not in effect at the time of the trial in this matter, as this Court is 
aware. 
Hess further argues in the Brief of Appellee that Bennion failed to marshal the 
evidence necessary to challenge the trial court's conclusion that Hess was entitled to an 
award of child care expenses. Brief of Appellee at pp. 8-9. While Bennion argued in Brief 
of Appellant that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding such compensation to 
Hess, he has still marshaled the necessary evidence to challenge the award as he has 
ferreted out the flaw in the trial court's application of the law in its Judgment regarding 
the child care. Brief of Appellant pp. 9-12. 
This Court has stated, "[w]hen challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, an 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against 
the clear weight of the evidence." Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT 503, H 11, 128 P.3d 
63, citing 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,^ 69, 99 P.3d 801. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that, to attack a trial court's finding of fact, "an appellant must 
first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ^ j 
21, 54 P.3d 1177 citing Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 
766, 773 (Utah 1995); see also Consolidation Coal v. Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 886 
P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994); Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Reid v. 
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). Marshaling the evidence to 
attack a trial court's factual findings is a heavy burden. See id This same case continued 
as follows: 
2 
In some instances, as in this case, an appellant, in attempting to meet its 
marshaling burden, also might assert that the record does not contain any 
evidence in support of a particular finding of fact. Under such 
circumstances, the heavy burden of marshaling all of the evidence in 
support of the finding of fact does not shift to the appellee in order to refute 
the appellant's assertion of the absence of evidence. Rather, the appellee, 
when confronted with such a "no evidence" sufficiency challenge, need only 
point to a scintilla of credible evidence from the record that supports the 
finding of fact in order to overcome the appellant's "no evidence" assertion 
and to demonstrate that the appellant has failed to meet its marshaling 
burden. 
Id at |^ 22 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, Bennion set forth Hess' testimony at trial in Brief of Appellant 
which is also supported by the record. Brief of Appellant at pp. 10-11. The record has also 
been submitted to this Court for review; however, Bennion's citation to the record and his 
submission of relevant exhibits in his opening brief supports his position that the trial 
court erred in its determination that Hess was entitled to an award for child care. Hess 
failed to provide written notification to either Bennion or the trial court regarding 
whether she was at school or work during the time that Bennion and Hess' two (2) 
children (hereinafter the "Children") were in child care. Furthermore, Hess should have 
been required to provide the written verification pursuant to the Decree and UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-45-7.16; Bennion argues that therein lies the trial court's error in its 
Judgment. While Hess testified that she never had the Children in child care unless she 
was at work or school, she did not provide written documentation to the trial court to 
support her contentions. By failing to do so, Hess failed to meet the appropriate standards 
as argued in Brief of Appellant which, in its acceptance of Hess' failure, led to the trial 
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court's error in its award of child care fees to Hess. Brief of Appellant at pp. 10-12. 
Therefore, Bennion has adequately marshaled the evidence necessary for this 
Court to review the trial court's error. Beus at |^ 11 & Wilson Supply at U 21. Bennion has 
set forth the evidence in the Brief of Appellant that supports his claim that the trial court's 
award of child care expenses was "so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight 
of the evidence" in that there was no evidence presented that supported Hess' contentions 
at trial. Beus at |^ 11. Furthermore, while Bennion has a heavy burden to meet in his 
claim, Hess has not cited to the record or provided any kind of evidence that supports the 
trial court's award in her favor. Hess cannot point to any credible evidence that she was 
entitled to child care expenses except for her own testimony and questionable receipts, 
which will be addressed below. Wilson Supply at ]^ 22. Therefore, Hess has failed to 
counter Bennion's argument that the trial court erred in its determination of child care 
fees to Hess inasmuch as Bennion has marshaled the necessary evidence to support his 
claims on appeal. 
IL HESS' TESTIMONY WAS INSUFFICIENT UNDER THE BEST 
EVIDENCE RULE AND THUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO 
SUBMIT WRITTEN VERIFICATION AS REQUIRED IN THE DECREE 
AND UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.16. 
In her Brief of Appellee, Hess argues that she was not required to provide written 
verification of her work and work-related schooling. Brief of Appellee at pp. 7-8. She 
cited to the trial court's finding that her day care expenses were for basic day care only 
and did not include any extracurricular or optional activities. However, this is not a 
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statement that was part of the record, rather it is a finding by the trial court. Brief of 
Appellee at p. 3. Hess further argues that her testimony was sufficient due to the trial 
court's ability to determine credibility. Id. at pp. 9-10. However, if Hess' testimony is the 
only evidence that was presented at trial as to what her child care expenses were, it is 
impossible for Bennion to rebut such testimony because it becomes a credibility 
determination while only one party clearly has access to the evidence. Moreover, while 
Bennion argues that Hess was required to provide written verification per the Decree and 
UTAH CODE ANN § 78-45-7.16 and wherein lies the trial court's flaw, Hess9 testimony is 
also insufficient pursuant to the best evidence rule. 
UTAH R. EVID. 1002 sets forth the best evidence rule, stating, "[t]o prove the 
content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or 
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by other rules 
adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or by Statute." The Utah Supreme Court has 
said concerning the best evidence rule that, "[t]he purpose of this rule is primarily to 
prevent mistake or fraud." Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ^ 37, 17 P.3d 1110 
citing 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1049, at 511 (1994); 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1061 
(1996); 6 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 
1002.03[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed.1997); 4 Wigmore on 
Evidence § 1179, at 417 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1972). The Court went on, 
"[t]herefore, when the content of a document is material to the matter to be proved, the 
original writing must be produced[.]" Id. citing Am.Jur.2d supra, § 1049, at 510; C.J.S. 
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supra, §§ 1057, 1059. The Utah Supreme Court has further explained that, "[t]he 'best 
evidence' rule generally has come to denote only the requirement that the contents of an 
available written document be proved by introduction of the document itself." Roods v. 
Roods, 645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah, 1982). 
In the instant case, Hess testified that the necessity of placing the minor children in 
daycare began in April of 2002 based upon her attendance at school, an internship, and 
her full-time work post-graduation. Rl 116 at p.20. Hess presented receipts for child care 
from June of 2002 through to the beginning of the year 2003. Rl 116 at p. 21. Bennion's 
counsel objected to the receipts, saying some were illegible and that many of them had no 
year written on them. Rl 11624. Bennion's counsel also objected saying that only her 
testimony was offered to indicate that the receipts were actually sent to Bennion. Id. 
Hess then produced more receipts from January 2003 through January 2006 for child 
care. R1116 at p.26. Bennion's counsel again objected stating that the receipts were 
supposed to be for child care, but that such receipts indicated they were program fees. 
Rl 116 at p. 30. The receipts for the boy and girls club cannot be construed to be for day 
care alone without further written evidence in support, since the boys and girls club does 
offer other various and numerous activities. 
Bennion argues that Hess was required by the Decree and UTAH CODE ANN § 78-
45-7.16 to provide written verification of all child care expenses. Brief of Appellant at pp. 
9-12. Hess attempts to argue that her testimony that she was at work is sufficient enough 
to justify an award in her favor. Brief of Appellee at p. 7. However, this stance must fail 
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pursuant to the best evidence rule, UTAH R. EviD. 1002. Bennion cannot adequately 
rebut Hess' testimony without written proof or verification that Hess is not mistaken or 
attempting to commit fraud. Gorostieta at j^ 37. Bennion cannot adequately rebut Hess's 
testimony and meaningfully expect to raise a credibility determination when Hess is the 
only individual with the evidence and has failed to produce it. Furthermore, Hess' 
testimony is insufficient to justify the award absent the actual receipts from the 
Children's daycare, of which Hess is presumed to be in possession. Hess cannot testify 
that the documents she did not provide to the trial court were indeed receipts for child 
care because those documents were more than likely available. Roods at 642. Therefore, 
under the best evidence rule, Hess should have been required by the trial court to provide 
written verification of her childcare expenses. Thus, the trial court erred in its acceptance 
of only Hess' testimony to validate the documents. 
III. HESS' CONTRADICTION BETWEEN "OFFSET" AND GRATUITOUS" 
CONCERNING INSURANCE PREMIUMS IS WITHOUT MERIT; IF 
THIS IS A VALID CLAIM, HESS' RECOURSE WAS TO FILE A CROSS-
APPEAL AND, SINCE NO CROSS-APPEAL WAS FILED, HESS IS 
BARRED FROM ARGUING SUCH IN THE BRIEF OF APPELLEE. 
UTAH R. APP. P. 4 (d) addresses how and when a cross-appeal may be filed: 
If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party 
may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on 
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time 
otherwise prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, 
whichever period last expires. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[a] [c]ross-appeal is a separate appeal raising 
distinct issues for review, and thus, cross-appeal must be able to stand on its own, 
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independent of original appeal, because original appeal may become irrelevant through 
mootness or voluntary dismissal." MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah, 1998) citing 
UTAH R. APP. P. 37. The Utah Supreme Court has further held as follows: 
The seminal case treating the issue of when a cross-appeal must be filed is 
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 538-39, 51 S.Ct. 243, 246, 75 L.Ed. 520 
(1931). In brief, the Langnes doctrine requires litigants to cross-appeal or 
cross-petition if they wish to attack a judgment of a lower court for the 
purpose of enlarging their own rights or lessening the rights of their 
opponent. Id.; Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700, 701 
(Utah 1980). Conversely, if appellees or respondents merely desire the 
affirmance of the lower court's judgment, they need not, and should not, 
cross-appeal or cross-petition. "The practical justification for the rule is that 
a party satisfied with the action of a lower court should not have to appeal 
from it in order to defend a judgment in his or her favor on any ground no 
matter what an adversary does." Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court 
Practice 364 (7th ed. 1993). 
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah,1996). 
In her Brief of Appellee, Hess argues that Bennion "gratuitously" covered the 
Children under his insurance and was thus not entitled to any reimbursement for 
supplying such insurance. Id at p. 12. Hess then contradicts herself by arguing that she 
was denied payment for insurance premiums from 2004 to the date of trial at issue 
herein, which constituted an offset determined and entered by the trial court. Id. at pp. 
13-14. Hess then changes positions again by stating that the offset did not occur at all. 
Id. It appears that Hess is arguing that Bennion was being gratuitous and then makes an 
offset argument, causing Hess to completely contradicted herself. Bennion argued in 
Brief of Appellant that the trial court did not grant him a credit or offset for maintaining 
8 
insurance on the Children. Ibid, at pp. 12-15. As set forth below, Hess' contentions 
counter what she contends to be the determinations of the trial court, which 
appropriately could only have been raised in a cross-appeal. As such, Hess is barred 
from raising such issue in Brief of Appellee. 
Hess had not provided insurance for the Children as she was required to do under 
the Decree. As Bennion testified to at the bench trial, he provided insurance for the 
children because he cares about them and perceived that Hess was not in compliance 
with the Decree. Rl 116 at p. 133. Bennion also testified that he had never received any 
kind of reimbursement or credit for the premiums he had paid for the children. Id. 
Paragraph 6 of the Decree states that any premiums or expenses not covered by 
insurance should be shared equally by the parties. Hess herself did not provide the 
insurance as the Decree required; instead, the Children were covered by her husband, 
Steve's, insurance until he was laid off, then she found an individual policy for the 
children through Blue Cross. Bennion argued that the trial court abused its discretion in 
that determination since the Decree and pertinent statutes set forth that he should receive 
a credit or offset for such payment. Brief of Appellant at pp. 12-15. Hess believes such 
offset occurred in the trial court's denial of reimbursement to her for insurance 
premiums paid from 2004 to the date of the trial in this matter. Thus, Hess' argument 
concerning the insurance premiums expressly contradicts what she perceives as the 
findings of the trial court. Such claims should have then been raised in a cross-appeal. 
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It is Bennion's position that he was denied either offset or credit for the insurance 
premiums paid for the children and that the determination not to reimburse Hess for 
premiums paid from 2004 to the time of trial was separate and distinct. Bennion should 
receive at least a credit of one-half of the insurance premiums that he has maintained on 
the minor children towards the judgment that was awarded to Hess for the insurance 
premiums for 2002 and 2003. Paragraph 6 of the Decree does state that the insurance 
premiums should be equally paid by the parties and does not specifically say that these 
premiums are to be paid equally by the parties for the party who is responsible for 
maintaining the insurance. 
Since Hess did not file a cross appeal as required by rule, Hess is precluded from 
raising a challenge to what she perceives is the determination of the trial court regarding 
the "offset" for insurance premiums paid by Bennion. UTAH R. APP. P. 4(d). Hess raises 
a separate issue for review in Brief of Appellee before this Court in arguing that Bennion 
gratuitously covered the Children on his own but then states that the offset was granted 
to Bennion by the trial court when it offset the premiums paid by Hess from 2004 to the 
time of trial. Brief of Appellee at pp. 13-14. Since this is a claim that challenges the trial 
court's determination concerning the insurance premiums, Hess cannot now raise such a 
claim without having filed a cross-appeal concerning it and, since she did not, such 
claim should be barred by this Court. 
Hess raises a distinct issue for review in the Brief of Appellee and has failed to 
10 
appropriately contain such a claim within a cross-appeal. MacKay (holding that a cross-
appeal raises distinct issues for review). Clearly, Hess wishes to attack the judgment of 
the trial court for the purpose of enlarging her own rights and/or to lessen the rights of 
Bennion. South at 356. However, since Hess has failed to appropriately file and raise 
such a claim within a cross-appeal, she can now only request this Court to affirm the 
trial court's judgment and must now be satisfied with the trial court's judgment in this 
matter. Id. Therefore, Hess cannot now raise a claim contrary to what she perceives as 
the determination of trial court and should thus be barred from doing so by this Court. 
Since the Decree requires the insurance premiums to be shared equally by the 
parties and does not designate the party to incur the original cost, Bennion should 
receive a credit towards the judgment for the 2002 and 2003 insurance premiums. The 
trial court abused its discretion in determining that Bennion should not receive full credit 
in the form of an offset for the insurance premiums paid by him for the Children 
beginning in 2004 to the present. See, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.16(4). 
IV. CHILD SUPPORT IS A BENEFIT OF THE CHILD; THUS, THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT VIOLATES BENNION'S OTHER THREE 
CHILDREN'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS WHICH RENDERS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7 FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED. 
In her Brief of Appellee, Hess misinterprets Bennion's argument by stating that 
Utah's child support guidelines violate Bennion's equal protection rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Brief of Appellee at p. 5. Hess misunderstands Bennion's 
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position. Bennion argues in Brief of Appellant that, because the trial court did not take 
into consideration Bennion's other three (3) children from a subsequent marriage in its 
determination of child support concerning the Children at issue herein, first and foremost, 
those three (3) children's rights were violated under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Brief of Appellant at pp. 15-20. 
Hess also argues that statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, but fails to 
acknowledge that such presumption can be rebuttable. Brief of Appellee at pp. 16-19. 
Furthermore, Hess argues that Bennion's claim faces five bars which it must overcome in 
order for his equal protection rights to have been violated. However, Hess cites no legal 
authority for such bars. Brief of Appellee at p. 5. Hess further argues that Bennion did 
not raise the issue of the trial court making findings regarding the support of his three (3) 
other children and how that should affect his child support obligations for the Children at 
issue herein until his opening brief, and that it cannot now be addressed. This is 
incorrect. Bennion clarifies below so as to further enlighten Hess for her future 
responses. 
UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. IV states as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. XIV states as follows: 
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
In Fauver v. Hansen, the Utah Court of Appeals set forth the following with respect to the 
purpose of child support: 
Utah courts have long held that the right to receive child support is an 
unalienable right, belonging to the child, and cannot be bartered away by 
the childfs parent or parents. Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981); 
Hansen v. Gossett, 590 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1979) (right to support 
belongs to the child); State Division of Family Services v. Clark, 554 P.2d 
1310, 1311-12 (Utah 1976) (child support duty is continuing and right to 
receive it is unalienable); Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 
1974) (a father cannot divest himself of the obligation to support, nor defeat 
the child's right to support). 
Ibid, 803 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Utah App.,1990) (emphasis added). UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-i2-i05(i) states as follows: "Every child is presumed to be in need of the support of 
the child's mother and father. Every mother and father shall support their children." The 
statute that Bennion asserts is facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied sets 
forth the factors the trial court must consider in determining an award of child support. 
See, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7. This Court has previously stated as follows: 
When asserting an as-applied challenge, the party claims that, under the 
facts of his particular case, ctthe statute was applied ... in an unconstitutional 
manner." [State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, f l n. 2, 993 P.2d 854]. In 
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contrast, "[w]hen asserting a facial challenge, a party seeks to vindicate not 
only his own rights, but those of others who may be adversely impacted by 
the statute in question." City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55-56, 
119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999). In making a facial challenge, the 
challenger asserts that the statute is so constitutionally flawed that "'no set 
of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.'" 
Herrera, 1999 UT 64, T|4 n. 2, 993 P.2d 854 (quoting United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 
(1987))(alteration in original). 
State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, f27, 100 P.3d 231. Concerning statutes and their 
rebuttable presumption, this Court has said the following: 
Under Utah's statutory child support scheme, the trial court is to apply the 
child support guidelines as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or 
modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support. UTAH 
CODE ANN.§ 78-45-7.2(2)(a) (Supp.1994). "In order to rebut this statutory 
presumption, the trial court must make a finding that use of the guidelines 
would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interest of the child." Hill 
v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App. 1992) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-45-7.2(3) (1992)). 
Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955, 958 (Utah App., 1994). This Court has held that, "[i]n 
order to rebut this statutory presumption, the trial court must make a finding that use of 
the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interest of the child." Hill 
v. Hill 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App., 1992) citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.2(3) 
(1992). Furthermore, should a trial court find that deviation is appropriate, the trial court 
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is required to make appropriate findings. See, Boyce v. Goble, 2000 UT App. 237, ^ 21, 
8 P.3d 1042 citing Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ^|16, 974 P.2d 306 quoting Allred 
v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah CtApp.1990). A trial court's failure to enter such 
findings is beyond the discretion of the trial court. Id 
In the instant case, Bennion was, in essence, requesting that the trial court deviate 
from UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.7 due to his support of his other three (3) children. 
However, Bennion could not provide to the trial court specific evidence as to the exact 
amount of support of his other three (3) children because Bennion's temporary orders 
regarding their support were pending. Bennion did testily, however, that he has three (3) 
other children besides the Children at issue herein, who also are entitled to his support. 
Throughout the proceedings, Bennion objected to the trial court choosing not to deviate 
from UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7 in its determination of child support. The trial court 
chose to reserve those issues as well as the constitutionality of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
45-7.7 for appeal. As is evidenced supra it was perfectly within the rules for Bennion to 
raise this issue in his opening brief 
In Brief of Appellee, Hess makes a general argument as to why statutes enjoy a 
presumption of constitutionality. Id. at pp. 15-20. However, when a trial court modifies 
an order of child support, the trial court is required to apply the child support guidelines 
as a rebuttable presumption pursuant to Utah's statutory child support scheme. Brooks at 
958. Furthermore, the presumption of constitutionality does not render a statute 
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unrebuttable or unchallengeable. If this were the case, the system of checks and 
balances upon which our government is based would be meaningless. 
The trial court in this case misapplied UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7 to Bennion's 
case in light of Bennion's three (3) other children that require his support. Thus, the trial 
court should have deviated from the statute and then undertaken an analysis of the eight 
steps as contained within UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7. Therefore, Bennion's 
argument that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7 is facially unconstitutional or 
unconstitutional as applied to his case is worthy of this Court's review as the trial court 
erred in making its determination in light of Bennion's other children. 
The child support award as ordered by the trial court violates Bennion's other 
three (3) children's rights to an equal share of his support as applied and facially under 
U.S. CONST. AMENDS IV and XIV and is thus unconstitutional. The trial court failed to 
take into consideration the fact that Bennion has three (3) other children for which he 
must provide support, thus an application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7, which does 
not take into account other children, is unconstitutional. Bennion provided adequate 
assurances to the trial court respecting his other three (3) children. Rl 116 at p. 147. 
However, this was not taken into consideration when the child support was calculated in 
this matter, violative of the right his other three (3) children have to an equal amount of 
support as the children at issue in this matter. See, Fauver v. Hansen, supra. Therefore, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7 pertaining to the calculation of child support is 
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unconstitutional in that it does not consider those children whom a parent is required to 
support that either live in their home or are the subject of temporary support orders. The 
Child Support Worksheet supplied for matters such as these fails to consider either of 
these circumstances, to the prejudice of Bennion in having to pay a greater percentage of 
his income in support for all children involved than is required of any other person under 
the child support laws. 
Additionally, the trial court did not make any findings that supported its decision 
not to deviate from UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.7. The trial court should have at least 
made a finding that it tcwould be unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interest" of the 
Children to deviate. Hill at 724. A trial court that decides to deviate must make specific 
findings to support its deviation. See, Boyce at ^ 21. If a trial court fails to do so, it is 
beyond the trial court's discretion. Id. Bennion argues that in light of his request for the 
trial court to deviate, the Judgment should have included a finding as to why it did not 
deviate. Therefore, Bennion's contention that the trial court erred in failing to deviate 
has merit. 
V. BENNION'S APPEAL IS NOT "FRIVOLOUS" AND THEREFORE, HESS 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS, OR DAMAGES ON 
APPEAL. 
Throughout the Brief of Appellee, Hess argues that Bennion's appeal is frivolous. 
Hess concludes that, since Bennion's appeal is frivolous, attorney's fees, costs, and 
damages should be awarded to her. Brief of Appellee at p. 24. She argues that Bennion's 
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appeal is not based in fact, is unwarranted by existing law, and puts forth no good faith 
arguments to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. Id. Hess also seems to imply that 
Bennion has caused unnecessary delay. Id. at p. 25. However, Hess has misapplied the 
applicative law that would grant such relief on appeal; therefore, Hess' argument that 
Bennion's appeal is frivolous is without merit and should be rejected by this Court. 
UTAH R. APP. P. 10 (a)(2) states that a party may move this Court within ten (10) 
days of filing the docketing statement "[t]o affirm the order or judgment which is the 
subject of review on the basis that the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to 
merit further proceedings and consideration by the appellate court[.]" UT R. APP. P. 
33(b) also state as follows in pertinent part: 
For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or 
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of 
delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause 
needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only 
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
This Court has previously stated the following concerning frivolous appeals and 
the sanctions that can result from such appeals: 
The Utah Supreme Court recently described a frivolous appeal as "c[o]ne in 
which no justiciable question has been presented and ... is readily 
recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever 
succeed/" Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990) {quoting Black's 
Law Dictionary 601 (5th ed. 1979)). Sanctions are appropriate for appeals 
"obviously without merit, with no reasonable likelihood of success, and 
which result in the delay of a proper judgment." Maughan v. Maughan, 770 
P.2d 156,162 (Utah App. 1989). However, sanctions for filing frivolous 
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appeals are "applied only in egregious cases, iest there be an improper 
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.'" Id. 
{quoting Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App.1988)). 
Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah App.,1992). 
In the instant case, Bennion has presented a meritable appeal before this Court, as 
evidenced by its proceeding to briefing on the issues raised therein. Bennion has 
complied with the Rules of Appellate Procedure in his Brief of Appellant. Not only are 
his arguments made with supporting case law that favor his positions, Bennion cites to 
the record in his efforts to demonstrate that the trial court erred in its Judgment. Thus, 
Bennion's Brief of Appellant cannot be found by this Court to be "frivolous." 
Moreover, if Hess felt that this appeal was indeed "not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law" then she could have exercised her rights under UTAH R. APP. P. 10 
(a)(2) to summarily dispose of the appeal. Hess did not exercise this option and, as was 
clear to this court from the issues set forth in the docketing statement, the appeal 
maintained merit and could thus not meet the "readily recognizable as devoid of merit in 
that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed" criteria set forth by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Hunt supra, to be categorized as "frivolous." Although Hess may disagree with 
the issues raised, frivolity carries a much heavier burden than a simply show of 
dissatisfaction by the opponent to the appeal. 
Moreover, Bennion notes that any delay that has occurred in this case has been 
caused by Hess. Hess made Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment in District Court and 
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requested two extensions to file her Brief of Appellee. Therefore, if anyone has caused a 
delay in this matter it is Hess. Thus, Bennion cannot be found to have caused delay in the 
appellate process of this case. UTAH R. APP. P. 33(b). While Bennion acknowledges that 
Hess can request damages in the Brief of Appellee, Bennion argues that, if his appeal was 
indeed frivolous, Hess should have filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to 
UTAH R. APP. P. 10 (a)(2). See, UTAH R. APP. P. 33 (c)(1). However, Hess did not do so, 
and cannot do so now as only jurisdictional arguments can be raised at any time. This 
further supports that Bennion's appeal is meritorious. 
Furthermore, Hess has not shown that Bennion's appeal is frivolous. Bennion 
presents several justiciable questions on appeal, for example: Bennion argues that, due to 
the trial court's failure to take into account his three (3) other children he is supporting, 
those three (3) children's rights under UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. XIV were 
violated (see, Brief of Appellant at pp. 15-20); Bennion argues that, due to the trial court's 
misapplication of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-.7.7, the statute is facially unconstitutional 
or unconstitutional as applied in his case (see, Id); Bennion also argues that, the trial 
court erred in accepting Hess' testimony as sufficient information with regards to child 
care expenses pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.16 when the Decree requires 
written verification (see, id. at pp. 9-12); and Bennion further argues that the trial court 
erred in not awarding him a credit or offset for the insurance premiums he paid for the 
Children (see, id. at pp. 12-15). Farrell at 302. These justiciable questions are not devoid 
of merit because Bennion cites to the record throughout his Brief of Appellant in support 
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of his arguments. Id. Furthermore, Bennion was able to rely upon supportive case law for 
his arguments throughout his Brief of Appellant which he used to analyze the facts and 
citations to the record. Thus, Bennion has presented this Court with a meritorious appeal 
that presents justiciable questions which is prospective of a successful appeal. Id. 
Therefore, since Bennion has presented this Court with a meritorious appeal, 
sanctions are not appropriate in this case. Id. Damages in the form of attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal can be awarded when an appeal is frivolous; however, Bennion's appeal 
cannot be construed as frivolous as Hess contends. See, UTAH R. APP. P. 33. 
Furthermore, sanctions for frivolous appeals are only applied in "egregious cases" which 
Bennion's appeal cannot be found to be due to the deserving issues raised therein for this 
Court's review. Farrell at 302. Hess has failed to show that Bennion's appeal is so 
egregious that it would warrant such sanctions. Additionally, this Court should be 
hesitant to grant such a request "lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal 
erroneous lower court decisions." Id. However, as Hess has argued so zealously against 
the issues presented herein, Bennion requests that should his appeal prevail that he be 
awarded costs and attorney's fees. Alternatively, should this Court determine that Hess is 
indeed entitled to attorney's fees, Bennion requests a hearing regarding the awarding of 
attorney's fees pursuant to UT. R. APP. P. 33(c)(3). 
VI. HESS FAILS TO SET FORTH SUFFICIENT LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
FOR HER LEGAL ASSERTIONS; THUS SUCH LEGAL ASSERTIONS 
SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BY THIS COURT. 
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Throughout the Brief of Appellee, Hess sets forth legal assertions and assumptions 
but does not support them with legal authority. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 5, 9, 10, 11, 
14, 16, 22, & 23. Thus, Bennion argues that such assertions made by Hess should be 
disregarded by this Court in its determination of this appeal. 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24 (a) (9) states that an argument "shall contain the contentions 
and reasons ... with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing 
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on." The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[i]mplicitly, rule 
24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority. We have previously stated that this court is 
not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah, 1998) (internal quotations omitted) 
citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) quoting Williamson v. Opsahl 92 
Ill.App.3d 1087,48 111. Dec. 510, 511, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981). 
This Court has held that, "[i]t is well established that a reviewing court will not 
address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Marquez, 2002 UT App. 
127, 16, 54 P.3d 637 citinz State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). This Court 
continued, stating, "all briefs must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically 
arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, 
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on motion or sua sponte by the court...." Id, citing State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,1 31, 973 
P.2d 404 (declining to address arguments because of failure to comply with rule 24). 
In the instant case, Hess sets forth legal assertions in her Brief of Appellee but 
does not support the assertions with legal authority. Hess argues that the trial court, as a 
fact finder, may not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of its discretion as a 
credibility evaluator. Id, at pp. 9-10. Hess also argues that the trial court is given 
deference on appeal with its determination. Id. However, both assertions are made 
without supportive legal authority or citation. Hess argues that Bennion's claim on 
appeal must fail for two (2) reasons. Id. at p. 11. Again, this assertion is made without 
supportive legal authority. Hess further argues that Bennion is precluded from raising as 
issue on appeal due to lack of preservation in the trial court below. Id. at p. 14. Again, 
Hess fails to provide any legal authority for her legal assertion. Hess argues that Bennion 
has raised in his opening brief issues not included in his docketing statement and should 
thus be precluded from raising issues in his opening brief. Id. at p. 22. This legal 
assertion is also made without any kind of legal authority and is also incorrect. UT. R. 
APP. P. 9(g) specifically states that issues not raised in the docketing statement may be 
raised on appeal, showing that Hess is completely mistaken in this argument, and she 
would have know this was an incorrect argument had she attempted to find some legal 
authority with which to support her argument. 
Hess further argues that oral arguments should not be granted. Id at p. 23. 
However, Hess' only citations are irrelevant since she failed to provide relevant legal 
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authority that adequately reflects why this Court's determination would not be aided by 
oral argument. Hess' Brief of Appellee fails to meet the requirements of UTAH R. APP. 
P. 24 (a) (9). The Brief of Appellee does not contain contentions and reasons with 
respect to the issues presented with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on. UTAH R. APP. P. 24 (a) (9). The Brief of Appellee contains several bold 
statements that fail to adequately brief Hess' responses to Bennion's claims as raised in 
his Brief of Appellant. Hess' legal assertions scattered throughout her Brief of Appellee 
are unsupported by legal authority and has dumped the burden of research upon this 
Court. Thomas at 305. Therefore, this Court should not address Hess' arguments in 
response to Bennion's Brief of Appellant due to Hess' inability to adequately brief her 
responses. Marquez at % 6. Since Hess' Brief of Appellee is not compliant with UTAH R. 
APP. P. 24, this Court should disregard her arguments in response to Bennion's Brief of 
Appellant. Id. Additionally, Bennion respectfully moves this Court to disregard Hess' 
responses to Brief of Appellant due to Hess' non-compliance with UTAH R. APP. P. 24. 
Furthermore, it is clear that Hess was unable to locate any authority to Bennion's 
challenges based on her failure to cite any case law other than general procedural law 
pertaining to marshaling the evidence, the Fourth Amendment, etc. Hess simply attempts 
to persuasively argue against Bennion's much supported Brief of Appellant by using 
colorful language that, in essence, says nothing against the supported challenges. Hess 
also chose to focus on what she must erroneously perceive to be applicable 2007 statutes 
when it is clear that those had not been passed by the Utah legislature and put into law 
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until after the trial at issue herein. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 4. Thus, Hess' argument 
that the cited statutes in Brief of Appellant were incorrect finds no merit in very basic 
law. Additionally, the "frivolous appeal" issue raised in Brief of Appellee has only been 
raised by Hess as a deterrent from an otherwise unsupported brief. Hess has no response 
to the supported challenges and thus relies upon a last ditch effort to try and dismiss a 
meritorious appeal. This Court should not allow Hess to intrude upon proper appellate 
procedure in this matter and be allowed to prevail. Hess has failed to support her 
position and this Court should give full faith and credit to Bennion's challenges as 
properly brought in good faith. No sanctions have been requested in this matter because 
such a challenge would clearly ring hollow and reflect poorly upon the opposition. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Bennion respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the Judgment in this matter and take any such further action as this Court 
deems appropriate. 
DATED, this 6th day of May 2008. 
Michael J. Thompson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I caused to be mailed, first class postage prepaid, a copy of the 
foregoing document, Reply Brief of Appellant, by mailing it first class mail, postage pre-
paid, on this 6th day of May 2008, to the following: 
Mr. David R. Ward 
Attorney for Appellee 
4543 South 700 East. Suite 200 






Decree of Divorce, dated May 19, 1998 
FILED OlSTitJOT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
David R. Ward #3379 
HUTCHISON, NEIDER, WARD & KING 
Attorney for Respondent 
5242 South College Dr., Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 268-9868 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHAD BENNION, ) 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. 
CHRISTINE BENNION, ] 
Respondent. ] 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
| Civil No. 964903735 DA 
1 Judge Glenn Iwasaki 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Honorable 
Glenn Iwasaki, Judge of the above-entitled Court, for entry of a 
Decree of Divorce, the Court having entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law herein and with good cause appearing 
therefor, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from the 
Defendant, the same to become final upon the signing and entry 
hereof. 
2. Respondent is awarded the sole care, custody and control 
of the parties' minor children, Aurora Bennion, born January 4, 
1994, and Adria Bennion, born July 29, 1995, subject to, unless 
HAY 1 Q jqq$ 
S*i.7
 L A K £ COUNTY 
otherwise agreed by the parties, reasonable visitation rights for 
the Petitioner as the parties may agree, including, but not limited 
to, the following: 
a. Three (3) two-week periods each year. Each party 
shall pay one-half of the cost to transport the children to 
Salt Lake City and back. The parties shall coordinate their 
schedules to accommodate these visits, and Plaintiff shall 
give Respondent at least a 30-day prior notice. 
b. Petitioner shall have visitation in California upon 
a 30-day prior notice to Respondent, or shorter notice if 
reasonable, so long as this does not interfere with plans that 
Respondent already has. 
3. Petitioner is required to pay child support to Respondent 
in the amount of $352.00 per month, continuing until the minor 
children reach the age of 18 or graduate from high school with 
their normal graduating class, whichever is later. Petitioner's 
income shall not be subject to income withholding pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. 78-45-7 et seq. and 62A-11-401 et seq. and 501 et seq 
unless he becomes more than 3 0 days delinquent in his support 
obligation. If automatic withholding does occur, an additional 
$7.00 check processing fee should be included in the amount 
withheld each month. 
2 
4. Commencing April 1, 1998, Petitioner is required to pay 
one-half (h) of all reasonable child care expenses incurred while 
working or while receiving occupational or career-related training. 
Respondent shall provide to Petitioner written verification of the 
cost and identity of a child care provider upon the initial 
engagement of the provider. 
5* The Respondent shall be allowed to claim the minor 
children as dependents for tax purposes. 
6. Respondent shall be required to maintain health and 
dental insurance on the minor children of the parties so long as 
the same is available at a reasonable cost through her employment. 
Commencing April 1, 1998, any premium for insurance coverage for 
the children and all of the children's medical and dental expenses 
not paid by insurance shall be shared equally by the parties. 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.15, Respondent shall 
be required to provide verification of insurance coverage to the 
Petitioner or to the Office of Recovery Services, if applicable, on 
or before January 2nd of each calendar year; furthermore, 
Respondent shall be required to notify the Petitioner or the Office 
of Recovery Services, if applicable, of any change of insurance 
carrier, premium or benefits within thirty (30) days of the date 
Respondent first knew or should have known of the change. 
8. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.15, either party who 
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incurs medical expenses on behalf of the minor children shall be 
required to provide written verification of the costs and payment 
of such medical expenses to the other party within thirty (30) days 
of payment. 
9. Neither party is required to pay alimony herein. 
10. The parties own certain household furnishings, furniture, 
appliances and personal property, and it is reasonable that each 
party should be awarded any such property which each presently has 
in his or her possession, except that Respondent is also awarded 
the following items: The cedar chest, oak closet (3 pieces), 
housewares (china, stemware, silverware, cookware) and one-half {\) 
of the collectibles* The collectibles shall be valued and divided 
within ninety (90) days after entry of this Decree of Divorce, 
except that Petitioner shall have the option to keep all the 
collectibles if, within that 90 days, he pays to Respondent the 
value of her one-half (h) share therein. 
11. The parties shall each be ordered to assume and pay the 
debts incurred in their own names since the separation, and hold 
the other harmless therefrom. Further, the Petitioner is required 
to assume and pay the obligations owing to Associates ($2,000), LDS 
Hospital ($680), Gerald Bennion ($7,100), Stayner Fitzgerald 
($400), Selco ($165) and any debts associated with the floral 
businesses, C & R Floral Wholesale and C & R Creations, owned 
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during the marriage. 
12. Each party is required to pay their own attorney fees and 
costs incurred herein. 
13. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other 
such documents as are required to implement the provisions of the 
Decree of Divorce entered by the Court, 
is /^-^day of M^u=bVl 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this 1998 
Approved: 
Judfcje Glenn K.Iwasaki 
District Court Judge 
Clark R. Ward 
Attorney for Petitioner 
On the d& 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
day of March, 1998, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Clark R. Ward 
Attorney for Petitioner 
7050 Union Park Center, Suite 420 




Long Title. S.B. 23 Child Support 
Guidelines, 2007 General Session, State 
of Utah, Chief Sponsor: Gregory S. Bell 
LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL S.B. 23 
<t Approved for Filing: E. Chelsea-McCarty <t 
<L 12-15-06 10:10 AM <L 
1 CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 
2 2007 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
4 Chief Sponsor: Gregory S. Bell 
5 House Sponsor: Lone D. Fowlke 
6 = = = = = = = = = = ^ ^ 
7 LONG TITLE 
8 General Description: 
9 This bill updates child support guidelines and makes other corrections. 
10 Highlighted Provisions: 
11 This bill: 
12 • recalculates and updates the child support table amounts; 
13 • defines "temporary" as less than 12 months; 
14 • requires the use of the same table when adjusting child support amounts due to 
15 aging out or death of a child; and 
16 • makes technical corrections. 
17 Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
18 None 
19 Other Special Clauses: 
20 This bill takes effect on July 1, 2008. 
21 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
22 AMENDS: 
23 78-45-2, as last amended by Chapters 161 and 186, Laws of Utah 2000 
24 78-45-7.2, as last amended by Chapter 176, Laws of Utah 2003 
25 78-45-7.5, as last amended by Chapter 324, Laws of Utah 2006 
26 78-45-7.7, as last amended by Chapter 255, Laws of Utah 2001 
27 78-45-7.10, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of Utah 2006 
S.B. 23 12-15-06 10:10 AM 
28 78-45-7.14, as repealed and reenacted by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1994 
29 78-45-7.15, as last amended by Chapter 176, Laws of Utah 2003 
30 78-45-7.16, as last amended by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1994 
31 78-45-7.21, as enacted by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1994 
32 = = = = = = = = = ^ 
33 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
34 Section 1. Section 78-45-2 is amended to read: 
35 78-45-2. Definitions. 
36 As used in this chapter: 
37 (1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection 78-45-7.6(1). 
38 (2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Recovery Services or the Department 
39 of Human Services. 
40 (3) "Administrative order" means an order that has been issued by the Office of 
41 Recovery Services, the Department of Human Services, or an administrative agency of another 
42 state or other comparable jurisdiction with similar authority to that of the office. 
43 (4) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered and is calculated 
44 using the guidelines before additions for medical expenses and work-related child care costs. 
45 (5) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support table," "base child 
46 support obligation table," "low income table," or "table" means the appropriate table in Section 
47 78-45-7.14. 
48 (6) "Child" means: 
49 (a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise emancipated, 
50 self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; 
51 (b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high school during the 
52 normal and expected year of graduation and not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, 
53 married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; or 
54 (c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and, if able 
55 to provide some financial resources to the family, is not able to support self by own means. 
56 (7) "Child support" means a base child support award as defined in [Section 78-45-2] 
57 this section, or a monthly financial award for uninsured medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHAD E. BENNION, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CHRISTINE M. BENNION 
(n.k.a. Christine Hess), 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
(September 05, 2007) 
tft>^703 73r 
Civil No. ^064903272-
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
THIS MATTER came before the court on September 5th, 2007, at the hour of 
8:00a.m. before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, Third District Court Judge, on 
Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Present were Petitioner Chad E. 
Bennion represented by counsel, Michael J. Thompson and counsel for Respondent, 
David R. Ward. Respondent, Christine Hess, was not present. 
Having taken oral argument, heard the representations of the respective parties, 
and considered the arguments presented by the parties' counsel, the Honorable Judge 
Glenn K. Iwasaki enters the following orders: 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court does not fault Respondent for approaching the Court on 
a Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment. 
2. As the Court received the document, there was the ability for the 
Court to weigh the impact of the document (exhibit) and while the Court 
was troubled by the lack of foundation as to any supporting documentation 
to support the summary, there was no documentation available for the 
Court to look at, the weight given to the document was diminimus 
because of the lack of foundation. 
3. The Court does not mean to indicate that mere testimony or only 
her testimony was used in a pejorative sense, but rather to emphasize the 
lack of any documentation to support her testimony. So when the Court 
indicated only her testimony, that's all that was there, it wasn't in a 
pejorative sense, it was only as an emphasis on the lack of any 
documentation. 
4. Accordingly, the Court after hearing argument and after being 
reminded of the Court's former ruling and analysis maintains the original 
position. 
WHEREFORE, the Court enters the following Orders: 
2 
ORDER 
1. Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is denied. 
2. The parties are each to bear their own respective attorney's fees. 
3. Mr. Thompson is directed to prepare the appropriate order. 
DATED ,this 2007. 
Commissioner Patrick 
Third Disfnct£ourt C#ml^agr 
Judge Glenn K. I w a s a k i ^ ^ 0 J O ^^ 
Third District Court Judge 




NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 7(F)(2) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
TO CHRISTINE M. BENNION n.k.a. CHRISTINE HESS and DAVID R. WARD: 
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure of 
the District Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order Prepared by the Respondent shall be 
the Order of the Court unless you file an Objection in writing within five (5) days from the 
date of the service of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing if sent by mail. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I [ ] hand delivered, [ ] sent via facsimile, [X] mailed, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing Order (September 05, 2007), on this 19th day of 
October, 2007 directed to: 
David R. Ward 
Attorney for Respondent 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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